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In theory, the incidence of a tax should be independent of which
side of the market it is levied on. This principle of liability side equiv-
alence underlies virtually all theories of tax incidence. Policy discus-
sions, however, tend to place great emphasis on the legal division of tax
payments. We use computerized experimental posted–o¤er markets to
test liability side equivalence. We …nd that market outcomes are essen-
tially the same when the tax is levied on sellers as when it is levied on
buyers. Prices in both treatments are slightly above the competitive
equilibrium. Thus we cannot reject liability side equivalence.
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One of the central results of tax incidence theory is that “the incidence of
the tax does not depend on which side of the market it is levied” (Kotliko¤
and Summers, 1987, p.1046). This result – called liability side equivalence
– holds for a variety of market structures under the assumption that prices
are ‡exible and individuals maximize their material well being. In fact,
this principle has been so widely accepted by economists that its empirical
validity has (almost) never been tested.
This is rather surprising, given that the statutory incidence of taxes and
other levies plays an important role in popular discussions. An article in
The Economist on the Scandinavian countries argued that one reason for
the large size of the welfare state was that “employers pay unusually heavy
social-security contributions, while employees pay little – encouraging the
impression that bene…ts cost nothing.”1 In Germany the introduction of
the nursing care insurance (P‡egeversicherung) was accompanied by heated
debates on how contributions should be split between employers and em-
ployees. In fact, just before the system was introduced, the division of con-
tributions was the central matter of con‡ict (Hinrichs, 1995).2 The weekly
newspaper Die Zeit summarized the discussion in an article entitled “Use-
ful illusion.”3 Proponents of scrapping the employer share of contribution
argued mainly that if employees had to bear the entire contribution, they
would be more aware of the full costs of insurance and therefore possibly opt
for lower spending levels. In addition, it was argued that reducing the em-
ployer share would lower labor costs and therefore improve the competitive
position of German …rms. Representatives of unions argued on the contrary
that an equal split of the contributions would be fair and should therefore
be incorporated.
This shows that popular impression seems to be based on the notion that
the division of contributions between employers and employees matters for
1Frances Cairncross, Womb to tomb – The road to debt is paved with good intentions,
The Economist, 5 Nov. 1994.
2Note that both employees and employers strongly resisted being “burdened” with the
entire contribution (see Hinrichs, 1995).
3Udo Perina, Nützliche Illusion, Die Zeit, 2 June 1995.
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economic outcomes. The division of those contributions also varies among
countries, whereas economic theory would suggest that the choice should be
dictated by minimization of administrative costs, hence, the formal incidence
should probably rest with one side of the market only.
Statutory incidence may play a role if subjects are not fully rational. For
instance, if individuals do not distinguish between gross and net earnings,
they may be prepared to bear a larger share of the tax if they have to pay
it. Alternatively, Kerschbamer and Kirschsteiger (1998) argue that statu-
tory incidence a¤ects social norms. For instance, subjects may think that
statutory incidence creates a moral obligation to bear the burden of the tax.
If this is the case, then statutory incidence may a¤ect market outcomes.
In economic experiments, taxes have been most notable by their ab-
sence.4 Quirmbach et al. (1996) present a general equilibrium analysis of tax
incidence based on the Harberger model. Franciosi et al. (1995) use posted–
o¤er markets similar to ours to analyze the e¤ect of fairness on prices. To
this e¤ect, they study how switching from a pro…t tax to a sales tax a¤ects
prices under designs that di¤ered with respect to whether or not seller prof-
its were disclosed. Neither of these papers addresses the question whether
statutory incidence matters.
The only experimental investigation of tax liability side equivalence that
we are aware of is Kerschbamer and Kirschsteiger (1998). They let subjects
play an ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982), where in one treatment a
tax has to be paid by the proposer and in the other by the responder.5
Kerschbamer and Kirschsteiger (1998) …nd that the side on which the tax
is levied bares a signi…cantly larger burden of the tax. They argue that in
games where social norms a¤ect the outcome, statutory incidence may have
real e¤ects.
Kerschbamer and Kirschsteiger use an ultimatum game as an example for
a market that is not perfect, since they argue that political discussions of tax
4There are several experiments on tax evasion. See, for example, Robben et al. (1990)
and Boso and Mittone (1997).
5 In the ultimatum game, the …rst player (the proposer) o¤ers a division of a pie of
…xed size to the second player (the responder). The responder can accept the division, in
which case it is implemented, or reject it, in which case both players earn nothing.
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liability side focus on such markets. Their results thus serve as a benchmark
for defective markets. It is well known that, in the ultimatum game, the sub-
game perfect equilibrium is almost never played in experiments. Therefore,
it is hard to interpret systematic deviations between di¤erent treatments. In
other words, as long as one is not exactly sure what drives subjects’ behavior
in the game without taxes, it is hard to give a behavioral interpretation to
any observed di¤erence in di¤erent tax treatments.
In any event, if tax equivalence fails, it must be due to subjects’ misper-
ceptions. For instance, Kerschbamer and Kirschsteiger argue that statutory
incidence may a¤ect social norms based on gross earnings. But it is di¢cult
to think of any such norm. For example, if subjects care about inequality,
it would seem very unreasonable to think they judge equality on the basis
of gross earnings instead of net earnings. One would then want to test in
which environments such misperceptions may prevail.
We perform such a test. Namely, we analyze the incidence of taxes in
experimental posted–o¤er markets. Compared to the ultimatum game this
market form is closer to many markets where excise and consumption taxes
are actually levied.6 In contrast to the extreme institution of the ultimatum
game we …nd that for this more realistic market institution, the theoretical
proposition that e¤ective incidence is not a¤ected by statutory incidence, is
not rejected by the data.
We proceed as follows. The next section presents the setup of the market
used in the experiment and the experimental design. Section 3 presents the
results of the experiment. The last section concludes with a discussion of
our results.
6Strictly speaking the ultimatum game is a posted-o¤er market with only one seller
and one buyer who bargain on the sale of a single unit of a good. In addition to the
economic frame of posted-o¤er markets (see Ho¤man et al., 1994), multiple sellers and
buyers distinguish our experiment from that of Kerschbamer and Kirschsteiger (1998).
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2 Experimental design and procedures
Our experiment consists of ten standard posted-o¤er markets (for a survey,
see Davis and Holt, 1995, ch.4). We also conducted two sessions where the
same market was played as a double auction (see Section 3 below). Since
double auctions are well known to converge to the competitive equilibrium
very quickly (see Davis and Holt, 1995, ch.3), experimental data supporting
the theory would not be much of a surprise in this case. By contrast, in
posted-o¤er markets “adjustment to equilibrium tends to be from above
and either converges to equilibrium more slowly [than double auctions] or
does not converge at all” (Plott, 1982, p.1498). For this reason, testing tax
liability equivalence in posted-o¤er markets provides a stronger test of the
theory. The double auctions were simply conducted to check for robustness
of the trading institution. Our two treatments di¤ered only with respect to
the tax liability side. In one treatment the buyers were to pay the tax, in
the other it were the sellers.
In each session three sellers and three buyers interacted. Sometimes two
sessions were conducted simultaneously, but subjects were then informed
that they only interacted in a group of six. The cost and demand structure
underlying our posted-o¤er markets are shown in Figure 1. Note that each
step on the cost and demand function consists of three units, one for each
seller and each buyer. This implies that, at the competitive price range,
40 · p · 46, twelve units are sold when there is no tax. More speci…cally,
each seller sells and each buyer purchases exactly four units.7 Payo¤s at
a competitive price of 43 are 102 Taler (the experimental currency unit)
for sellers and 130 Taler for buyers. This asymmetry to the advantage of
the buyers was introduced to o¤set an expected e¤ect of the market power
of sellers. Since subjects were unaware of the payo¤s of the other subjects,
this asymmetry could not cause a price increase due to equity considerations.
(Note that in Figure 1 the graphs are slightly o¤set to make the parts where
they are actually parallel better visible.)
7We wanted to have a relatively large number of units being sold without a tax such
that, after the introduction of the tax, the reduction of the number of units sold and the
resulting reduction of payo¤s is not too drastic. Low payo¤s may frustrate subjects and
induce non-sensical decisions (see Holt, 1985).
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Figure 1: The experimental markets
Sellers could only post integer prices. Under the assumption that de-
mand will be split equally between the sellers if posted prices are equal,
there are six symmetric pure-strategy equilibria. Each equilibrium involves
a price of the set [46; :::; 51] and …ve units o¤ered by each seller.8 In these
Nash equilibira, sellers will all sell four units but will sell less if they increase
the price. Note, however, that for prices up to 56, buyers will also buy four
units each.
After the …rst half of the experiment, a tax of 28 Taler was introduced.
Now nine units are sold at competitive prices, three for each participant,
no matter whether we have a buyer or a seller tax. The competitive price
range is 56¡62 in gross prices and 28¡34 in net prices. The Nash equilibria
(again assuming equal split of demand in case of a tie) are that each seller
o¤ers four units. Symmetric gross equilibrium prices are in [62; :::; 66] and
net prices are in [34; :::; 38], that is there are …ve symmetric pure-strategy
8Note that, with a continuous action space, there would be a unique Nash equilibrium
in which all players post a price of 46 and o¤er …ve units.
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Nash equilibria, in which sellers sell three units each. Buyers will buy three
units each for prices up to 72 or 44, respectively. Payo¤s at a competitive
price of 59 (or 31) are 57 Taler for sellers and 69 Taler for buyers.
The experiment was conducted at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin in
July 1999. In total ten sessions were conducted, …ve for each of the two
treatments. The total of 60 subjects were recruited in undergraduate and
graduate economics courses. Subjects were placed at isolated computer ter-
minals. They were then given written instructions. These instructions were
the same for both sellers and buyers and subjects were not informed about
their role at that point. Then they could ask clarifying questions. The ex-
periment was implemented in Z-Tree, a software developed by Fischbacher
(1999). In total 24 periods were played in each session, twelve without taxes
followed by twelve periods with a tax. Subjects were informed before the
experiment started that after twelve periods a change in the market would
be introduced and that another twelve periods would follow. No indication
was made that this change would be the introduction of a tax.
At the beginning of each period sellers were informed about the costs
for each individual unit they could sell. Both the maximum quantity a
seller could o¤er and the maximal quantity a buyer could purchase were
…ve. Buyers learned to be buyers in the …rst period by just being exposed
to the waiting screen. Sellers o¤ered a contract by indicating a price and
the maximal quantity they wanted to sell at this price.
After all sellers had either o¤ered a contract or had decided not to make
an o¤er (which happened only in two out of 120 cases) the buyers were
randomly ordered. This was conducted independently for each period. All
participants were informed about the prices demanded and the correspond-
ing seller numbers (though not the maximal quantity o¤ered).
At this stage the …rst buyer was informed about the valuations for all
units he could buy. Then he could either decide not to buy at all or choose
the seller from whom he wanted to buy and the maximal quantity he wanted
to buy for the posted price. If this quantity was available from the chosen
seller, the buyer received this quantity. However, if this was not the case,
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the buyer received all the units o¤ered by the seller. He was then informed
about the quantity he had received and for each unit about the pro…t (or
loss) he had made. Then he could choose whether and how many units he
wished to buy from another seller. At that stage he could only ask for a
quantity such that the total quantity bought would not exceed …ve. If again
the desired quantity was not available, the buyer received all units o¤ered
and was informed about the quantity he had received as well as the pro…t
made for each unit. He could then decide whether he also wanted to buy
from the third seller.
After the …rst buyer had completed all transactions or had decided not
to buy anything at all the second buyer ran through the same procedure, if
there were any o¤ers left. All sellers who had sold the whole quantity were
deleted from the list from which the buyers could choose. If the second buyer
had completed all transactions or had decided not to buy anything and if
not all sellers had sold everything, the third buyer could choose among the
remaining contracts.
When all buyers were …nished or no more o¤ers were standing, all sub-
jects received a feedback in the following form. They were informed which
of the contracts o¤ered by the sellers were accepted and which were rejected
(a contract was considered accepted if at least one unit was sold). Sub-
jects were also given a summary about their trading. They were informed
about the costs or values of all units they could have sold or bought, how
many units they had sold or bought, the prices for which they had o¤ered
or bought the units and the pro…ts they had made with the individual units
as well as the total pro…t for that period.
After the twelfth period it was publicly announced that a tax of 28 Taler
for each unit bought or sold would be imposed on one side of the market.
In …ve sessions sellers had to pay the tax, in …ve sessions buyers. Then
twelve periods were played exactly as before, except that at all stages where
information was given concerning the costs or values of units sold the tax
was also explicitly indicated (for the buyers or the sellers, depending on the
treatment). Also, the tax was included in the computation and feedback of
pro…ts per individual unit.
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At the end of the total 24 periods, a questionnaire was to be …lled out by
the subjects. They were asked for some biographical data as well as how they
had come to their decisions. Finally they were informed about their total
payo¤ in DM, which was paid immediately after the end of the experiment.
The exchange rate was 1 DM for 60 experimental currency units.
3 Experimental results
Figure 2 and Table 1 summarize the experimental results. In Appendix A
the results are presented for each of the ten sessions separately. Figure 2
shows graphically the evolution of the mean of those prices which resulted in
contracts along with the number of units sold.9 Stars (?) and solid triangles
(N) were used to indicate these numbers for the treatment SellerTax and
BuyerTax respectively. Note that prices for period 13 to 24 of the latter
treatment are reported after adding the unit tax, i.e. shown are the e¤ective
prices for buyers. In Figure 2 the range of competitive price predictions as
well as competitive quantity predictions are indicated by dotted horizontal
lines extending across periods 1 to 12 (…rst phase) and periods 13 to 24
(second phase). Although the …rst–phase situation was identical in both
treatments, Figure 2 and Table 1 report the corresponding results separately
for the two treatments. This was done to easily make visible the e¤ect the
imposition of the tax has on …rst–period behavior in the second phase in
comparison to last–period behavior in the …rst phase of the experiment.
Let us …rst consider the results of the …rst phase of the experiment.
Inspecting Figure 2 or Table 1 we make the following observations:
(a) In both treatments average prices in period 1 are below the lower
end of the competitive price range (40) and in periods 1 to 6 average prices
in treatment BuyerTax are higher than in treatment SellerTax. (The
latter, however, seems entirely due to the fact that in treatment BuyerTax
sellers (by chance) start in period 1 with on average higher prices.)
9As one can see in Table 1 the average prices per period do not di¤er to a large extent
whether or not the prices are weighted with the number of units sold. The unweighted
average prices are shown here.
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Figure 2: Summary of experimental results (?: SellerTax, N: BuyerTax)
(b) Crossing the range of competitive prices, mean prices in both treat-
ments then quickly jump upward and stabilize at a common level of about
52 ¡ 53 which is distinctly above the upper end of the competitive price
range (46).
(c) It seems fair to say that in periods 7 to 12 there is no trend whatsoever
in the evolution of the mean prices in both treatments. Furthermore, for
the sake of comparison, note that in the last period of the …rst phase, i.e.
in period 12, the average price was with 53:9 respectively 53:7 virtually the
same in both treatments.
(d) With regard to the level of units sold during the …rst phase of the
experiment we observe that it is rather stable over the rounds. The average
number of units is 10:45 which is slightly below the competitive quantity
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prediction of 12 units. However, this is understandable given that prices
occasionally exceed 56 such that the demand is lower than 12.
Next consider the second phase of the experiment. Here either sellers or
buyers had to pay a tax of 28 Talers per unit. Inspecting Figure 2 or Table
1 again we make the following observations:
(a) The average price in period 13 is 65:9 (SellerTax) and 70:8 (Buyer-
Tax), i.e. in both treatments the price is above the upper end of the com-
petitive price range (62). This is true for all periods of the second phase.
(b) In both treatments there is an overall downward trend in the evolu-
tion of the mean price in the second phase of the experiment. More precisely,
whereas the mean price in treatment BuyerTax stabilizes at a level of about
66 towards the end of the second phase, in treatment SellerTax there is
some further decrease in the last two periods.
(c) The overall downward trend in mean prices is accompanied by an
upward trend in the evolution of the average number of units sold. However,
whereas mean prices in both treatments are still supracompetitive in the last
period, the number of units sold is exactly 9 in the last period in all of the
ten sessions as predicted by the competitive equilibrium.
Let us now concentrate on the main question of this study: Does it make
a di¤erence which side of the market the incidence of the tax is levied on? In
the light of our experimental results the answer to this question is no. First
of all note that there are hardly any di¤erences in average prices (across all
periods of the second phase) which resulted in contracts (66.9 in treatment
SellerTax versus 67.6 in treatment BuyerTax) and numbers of units sold
(7.9 versus 7.8, see the last line in Table 1). This result can be statistically
validated.
We conducted regressions using the tax liability side as a dummy and
taking possible statistical dependence between the observations in one ses-
sion into account. (Ignoring the possible dependence and considering all
contracts as independent observations, the regressions would be equivalent
to a T-test that ignores the dependence.) Considering accepted contracts
of the last six periods (19 to 24) of all sessions (mean SellerTax: 65.3,
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SellerTax BuyerTax
Period Price Min Max Var weighted Quant. E¤. Price Min Max Var weighted Quant. E¤.
of PRICES Price in % of PRICES Price in %
1 24.8 6 40 104.3 26.6 8.4 72.5 36.7 20 55 129.2 38.6 8.0 65.4
2 31.0 10 45 79.4 33.3 10.4 84.5 43.9 30 80 182.6 43.8 10.8 90.7
3 37.7 28 47 37.4 38.8 11.6 93.7 48.9 34 65 77.9 49.6 9.8 85.9
4 45.5 38 56 34.4 45.6 11.8 96.5 53.1 40 70 64.7 52.2 9.8 83.3
5 51.1 42 60 32.4 50.6 11.6 92.9 55.0 40 66 52.8 54.5 10.2 87.8
6 52.2 43 60 26.7 52.2 10.4 86.8 55.1 47 70 45.8 53.4 10.2 86.9
7 54.4 47 60 11.8 54.4 10.6 92.0 53.8 35 65 57.7 53.3 10.6 88.9
8 54.9 52 58 4.7 54.5 10.4 90.0 51.8 15 66 139.4 53.7 10.0 86.1
9 54.2 50 60 8.3 53.8 10.2 86.2 54.5 47 66 25.4 53.9 10.8 92.2
10 53.9 46 61 10.8 53.4 11.0 93.4 52.6 46 60 18.0 52.5 11.4 93.1
11 53.9 47 62 16.6 53.2 10.8 91.5 52.3 46 61 17.8 52.1 11.2 94.0
12 53.9 48 62 18.6 53.2 10.6 88.0 53.7 48 65 28.8 52.3 11.0 90.1
Mean 47.3 38.1 55.9 32.1 47.5 10.6 89.0 50.9 37.3 65.8 70.0 50.8 10.3 87.0
13 65.9 51 82 139.7 65.9 7.0 77.5 70.8 54 85 96.3 69.0 6.6 75.3
14 69.6 60 80 45.3 69.8 6.6 70.0 70.6 62 77 27.8 70.1 6.6 66.7
15 70.1 60 80 33.2 69.7 7.2 79.3 69.4 63 76 22.2 69.0 6.8 74.7
16 69.1 62 75 24.1 69.0 7.0 78.1 67.2 62 74 18.6 67.5 7.0 74.3
17 69.0 62 74 17.7 68.6 7.6 86.1 67.8 61 74 19.6 67.0 7.8 83.3
18 67.3 62 73 17.0 67.4 7.0 74.5 67.1 62 74 21.0 66.3 7.6 84.6
19 66.1 55 73 31.9 66.2 8.2 87.2 67.0 61 73 15.1 66.5 8.0 85.6
20 65.8 60 71 12.7 65.9 8.6 89.4 66.5 60 71 14.3 66.4 8.6 90.0
21 66.1 61 72 10.6 65.8 8.6 93.4 66.2 59 70 13.5 66.0 8.6 92.2
22 65.6 62 70 7.5 65.6 8.8 92.3 66.1 59 70 14.8 65.9 8.2 89.0
23 65.1 61 70 8.0 65.0 8.8 93.4 66.0 59 70 13.1 66.0 8.6 91.2
24 63.4 60 70 8.6 63.8 9.0 94.6 66.0 60 70 10.6 66.0 9.0 92.8
Mean 66.9 59.7 74.2 29.7 66.9 7.9 84.7 67.6 60.2 73.7 23.9 67.1 7.8 83.3
Table 1: Summary of experimental results (weighted prices in parentheses).
mean BuyerTax: 66.3), we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no in‡u-
ence of the liability side (p = :665). Furthermore, this rather small di¤er-
ence is primarily caused by the last period. Including only periods 19 to
23 (mean SellerTax: 65.7, mean BuyerTax: 66.3) and using the same
test, we obtain a level of signi…cance p = :786:10 For the last period alone
the mean prices that resulted in contracts are 63.4 (SellerTax) and 66.0
(BuyerTax). This di¤erence is not signi…cant either (p = :177). For all
other of the last six periods the di¤erence between the two treatments is
smaller and far from signi…cant. Furthermore, the minimal and maximal
prices di¤er only marginally between the two treatments in the last …ve pe-
riods, though the variance of prices is slightly higher in the treatment Buy-
erTax. It is remarkable that the introduction of the tax does not cause
much disturbance in the market. Although the prices of accepted contracts
di¤er in the …rst period after the introduction of the tax (65:9, SellerTax,
and 70:8; BuyerTax), this di¤erence is also not signi…cant (p = :165).11
The increase in prices through the introduction of the tax (12:0, Seller-
Tax, and 17:1; BuyerTax) is close to the increase in equilibrium, which
is 16. Furthermore, the di¤erence between the two treatments disappears
almost completely in the next period.
The e¢ciency in the periods with tax is nearly equal in both treat-
ments, being slightly higher in the treatment SellerTax (84.7) than in
the treatment BuyerTax (83.3). The di¤erence is even smaller than the
corresponding di¤erence for the periods without tax (89.0 versus 87.0), so
that it can rather be attributed to chance or to better performance by the
subjects in the …rst treatment than to a treatment e¤ect.
The average duration of a session was 75 minutes. On average subjects
earned DM 31.00 (DM 34.13 for the sellers and DM 27.88 for the buyers). In
the periods with taxes the relative earnings of sellers and buyers are roughly
10Even if we ignore the possible dependence and consider all prices that resulted in
contracts in periods 19 to 23 as independent observations, we obtain a level of signi…cance
of only p = :319:
1195% con…dence intervals for the coe¢cient of the treatment dummy are as follows.
Periods 19 to 24: [¡3:82; 5:71], periods 19 to 23: [¡4:39; 5:63], period 24: [¡1:40; 6:54],
period 13: [¡2:45; 12:30]:
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equal in both treatments (DM 12.71 to DM 8.62 in treatment SellerTax
and DM 12.61 to DM 8.39 in treatment BuyerTax). Hence the allocation
of social wealth is not in‡uenced by the side which the tax is levied on.
In the two double auction sessions there is not a treatment e¤ect either.
Both with and without tax, prices in treatment SellerTax are close to the
upper end of the competitive price range whereas in treatment BuyerTax
prices are slightly below the lower end of the competitive price range. The
di¤erence between the prices in both treatments after introducing the tax
is of the same magnitude as it is in last two periods without tax. Note
that this di¤erence is opposite to what could be expected if tax liability side
mattered, namely higher prices in treatment BuyerTax.
4 Discussion
We presented an experiment on tax liability side equivalence in posted-o¤er
markets. Prices are above the competitive price range, in both treatments as
well as after some experience in the …rst phase without taxes. However, they
are within the range of prices where demand is equal to equilibrium demand.
Such supracompetitive prices frequently occur in posted-o¤er markets and
might be attributed to collusion of the sellers. Contrary to Kerschbamer
and Kirchsteiger (1998) we do not …nd a signi…cant in‡uence of the tax
liability side. Therefore, we conclude that in posted-o¤er markets, the legal
distinction which side of the market has to pay a tax has no in‡uence on
market outcomes.
Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger use their experiments to draw some policy
conclusions. In particular, they argue that statutory tax incidence may af-
fect the performance of markets where social norms can a¤ect the outcome.
For instance, if the characteristics of a good are not completely speci…ed
before trade takes place, social norms may prevent market clearing. The
ultimatum game represents such a market form. Kerschbamer and Kirch-
steiger cite labor markets as an example where social norms matter and,
hence, statutory incidence may have e¤ects in …eld markets.
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We have used posted-o¤er markets as an example of a market which
functions reasonably well but not perfectly, and found that incidence theory
is con…rmed. From a policy perspective, the question is: Does statutory
tax incidence matter? We do not think that the ultimatum game is general
enough as an imperfect market to draw policy conclusions for, say, labor
markets. From a methodological viewpoint, we can think of a continuum of
market forms, ranging from those that do not work well (like the ultimatum
game) to those that converge very quickly, such as double auctions. Some-
where along this continuum might be a line which separates those markets
where statutory incidence matters from those where it does not. Future
research may help us draw this line.
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Figure 3: Evolution of prices and units (o¤ered and sold) in the treatment
BuyerTax (¥: mean of prices which resulted in contracts and number of
units sold, ¤: mean of all prices and units o¤ered).
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Figure 4: Evolution of prices and units (o¤ered and sold) in the treatment
SellerTax (¥: mean of prices which resulted in contracts and number of
units sold, ¤: mean of all prices and units o¤ered).
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